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CLIENT BEWARE: THE NEED
FOR A MANDATORY WRITTEN FEE
AGREEMENT RULE
LAWRENCE A. DUBIN*
I. Introduction
Imagine this scenario.' A client calls his lawyer to ask a quick question. The
client is in the process of hiring a contractor to build an addition to his home.
The client wants to know whether a written agreement should be entered into
between the client and the contractor. The obvious answer is that any lawyer
would advise the client to obtain a written agreement. If the client wonders why
a handshake would not suffice, the lawyer would explain that the agreement
would ensure that there is a meeting of the minds - an understanding between
the parties as to exactly what services the contractor agrees to perform and what
sums of money the client agrees to pay. Now assume that a different client has
made an appointment with this same lawyer to discuss a legal problem. At the
meeting with the client, the lawyer quotes a fee to perform certain legal services
and the client accepts the terms of retention. Would it seem fair to expect the
lawyer to be ethically required to enter into a written fee agreement with the
client detailing the legal services to be performed and the obligation of the client
to pay the legal services? Surprisingly, the answer is "no.' '2
Misunderstandings about legal fees are a frequent occurrence. Philip Thomas,
Grievance Administrator for the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission estimates
that 85% to 90% of grievances filed by clients against their lawyers contain some
allegation related to a fee dispute.'
o 1998 Lawrence A. Dubin
* B.A. & J.D. from the University of Michigan. Professor of Law at the University of Detroit
Mercy School of Law. Appointed by the Michigan Supreme Court as a member of the Attorney
Grievance Commission from 1978 - 1986 and Chair of the Commission in 1985-86.
The author would like to express his gratitude to Melissa Eckhause, a third-year law student, who
provided him with outstanding research assistance.
1. This hypothetical factual situation was used by the author in an article published on the editorial
page of the Detroit News. See Lawrence A. Dubin, Consumer Beware When Hiring a Lawyer, DETROrr
NEws, Sept. 23, 1994, at All, restated in Lawrence A. Dubin, How the Michigan Supreme Court Can
Better Protect the Public from Bad Lawyers: The Ball Is in Their Court, 73 U. DET. MERcY L. REv.
667, 680 (1996) [hereinafter Dubin, Protect the Public].
2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct states a preference for written fee agreements when
the client has not been previously represented. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule
1.5(b) (1983). However, the current rules do not mandate such a requirement for written fee agreements
in non-contingent fee cases.
3. See Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note 1, at 681; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHIcs 503 (1986) ("The desirability of a writing is suggested by occasional statistics from fee
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Having served on a state-wide commission empowered to prosecute lawyers for acts
of misconduct, I have read many grievances filed by clients expressing frustration and
concern about the use of oral fee agreements.4 The typical grievance filed by a client
concerning a fee dispute would read as follows:
When I hired my lawyer to handle my divorce, the lawyer quoted me a
fee of $5,000. I paid the $5,000 fee in full. I never received another bill
until two years later when my divorce was completed. At that time, my
lawyer sent me an invoice stating that I owed $20,000 for legal services.
Our oral agreement was only for $5,000, and now my lawyer is acting in
an unethical manner by charging more than I agreed to pay.'
A lawyer's typical answer to this grievance would read:
This emotionally unstable client forgot to mention that the $5,000 retainer
only covered the first twenty-five hours of legal service. The client was
informed that any other legal services would be billed at the rate of $200
per hour. Since I performed an additional one hundred hours of work that
were not covered by the original retainer, the client owes me a balance of
$20,000.6
The problem in this hypothetical scenario is the lack of a clear fee agreement. The
terms of the agreement between the lawyer and the client were never memorialized
in writing, nor were they required to be. Therefore, the disciplinary authority would
likely conclude that a fee dispute exists between lawyer and client rather than an
ethical breach by the lawyer.
The most effective way to avoid fee disputes is to have lawyers utilize a written fee
agreement at the outset of the representation7. A well respected lawyer recently stated:
arbitration agencies showing that a high percentage of disputes involve unwritten fee agreements."). See
generally Marcia M. McBrien, Written Fee Agreements Required by Proposed Rule - Noncompliance
Could Violate Ethics Code, 11 MicH. L. WKLY. 512 (1997) (indicating that the subject of legal fees is
one of the top complaints that clients have about lawyers) [hereinafter McBrien, Noncompliance]; Loren
Singer, Ethics Complaints, A Top 10 List, West's Legal News, Mar. 14, 1996, at 1323, available in 1996
WL 259043 (providing similar information).
4. The author was appointed by the Michigan Supreme Court to serve as a member of Michigan
Attorney Grievance Commission - the statewide entity empowered to prosecute lawyers for acts of
misconduct. The author served on the commission from 1978-1986.
5. Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note 1, at 681-82.
6. Id. at 682.
7. See id. at 681 n.60, wherein former Michigan Grievance Administrator Michael Schwartz,
a decade ago, advocated the need for a mandatory fee agreement:
The salutary reasons for requiring written fee agreements in contingency fee cases and
wrongful death cases are equally compelling in other matters. The Commission notes
that a large percentage of Requests for Investigation, which it receives are fee-related.
It is suggested that the presence of written fee agreements might alleviate the
situation. In any event, the existence of such written fee agreements would provide
evidence of the actual fee agreed upon and would materially assist in the resolution
of such requests. It is submitted that if automobile mechanics can be required to
provide customers with written estimates, there is no reason for lawyers to have lower
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While the risk of fee disputes is a reality of professional life, there are
steps that you can take to substantially reduce that risk. Most sig-
nificantly, the subject of fees should be discussed and agreed upon before
you undertake to represent a client. The importance of a written fee
agreement cannot be overemphasized. The constant refrain one hears from
attorneys who -have served on a disciplinary board or on fee arbitration
panels is that most fee disputes could have been avoided had the lawyers
prepared a written fee agreement at the outset clarifying the scope of
services to be provided and the basis upon which fees would be charged
and billed.'
Echoing this sentiment, Ann Massie Nelson, Director of Marketing and Com-
munications at Wisconsin Lawyer's Mutual Insurance Co. further contends that a
lawyer's written acknowledgement of the terms of engagement "benefits the attorney
as well as the client by documenting the mutual expectations set forth in the initial
attorney-client conference."9
With the widespread recognition that the use of written fee agreements would be
beneficial to lawyers and clients in reducing the large number of fee disputes, the
pertinent question becomes why is there no such mandatory rule?
II. Current Status of Requirement for Written Fee Agreements
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility was
silent on the need for written fee agreements." Even though no disciplinary rule
formerly addressed the topic of written fee agreements, Ethical Consideration 2-19
strongly recognized that written fee agreements should be used to prevent lawyer and
client misunderstandings regarding fees. Ethical Consideration 2-19 stated:
As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desirable that
he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee
charges to be made. Such a course would not only prevent later
misunderstandings but will also work for good relations between the
lawyer and the client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the
understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is
contingent. A lawyer should be mindful that many persons who desire to
employ him may have had little or no experience with fee charges of
lawyers, and for this reason he should fully explain to such persons the
reasons for the particular fee arrangement he proposes."
standards.
Id.
8. R. Kelly Sheridan, President's Message, 44 R.I. BAR J. 3, 4 (Feb. 1996).
9. Ann Massie Nelson, Accept It: Engagement Letters DocumentAttorney and Client Expectations,
And Help To Cover-Your-Bases, WIS. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 56.
10. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980).
II. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1980). The ethical considerations
of the Code of Professionally Responsibility were aspirational in nature and not intended to be
1998]
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The original draft of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognized
the importance of written fee agreements by proposing a rule that would have
mandated the use of written fee agreements for new clients who had not been
regularly represented by the lawyer. 2 However, the ABA House of Delegates
rejected the mandatory nature of the proposed written fee agreement rule and
elected to make it aspirational (i.e., a preference). 3 The only exception is a
contingency fee agreement which is required to be in writing.'
Even though the ABA Model Rule 1.5(B) does not require written fee agreements
in non-contingent fee cases, the Comment entitled "Basis or Rate of Fee" clearly
articulates the strong policy that would support a mandatory written fee rule. The
comment to Rule 1.5(B) states:
When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will
have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee.
In a new client-lawyer relationship however, an understanding as to the
fee shall be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the
factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly
involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that
the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated
amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in
finally fixing the fee. A written statement concerning the fee reduces
the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple
memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is
sufficient if the basis or the rate of the fee is set forth. 5
enforced.
12. See Fee Agreements-Practice Guide, A.B.AJ..N.A. Law Manual Prof. Conduct 41: 111 (1995);
see also Wolfram, supra note 3, at 503 n.43 (indicating that the proposed final draft of rule 1.5(b) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct only required the basis of the rate of the legal fee to be in writing.)
13. See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 503 n.43 (citing AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, THE LEGIsLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 40-41 (1987); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(B) (1983)
("When a lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis for rate of the fee shall be
communicated to the client preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing
the representation.").
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(C) (1983). The rule states in part:
A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the
fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be
deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after
the contingent fee is calculated.
Id.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(B) cmt. (1983); see also CENTER FOR
PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 56 (3d
ed. 1995) (discussing a lawyer's duty to explain and communicate about fees to be charged (citing
Watson v. Cook, 616 So. 2d 803 (La. Ct. App. 1993) and DeGraaff v. Fusco, 660 A.2d 9 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995))); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993).
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A MANDATORY WRI7TEN FEE AGREEMENT RULE
Although there appears to be a consensus that mandatory written fee agreements
would substantially reduce fee disputes between lawyers and clients, only
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia mandate
written fee agreements when the client has not been previously represented by the
lawyer.'6
III. The Michigan Experience: An Examination As To
Why Lawyers Oppose a Mandatory Written Fee Rule
Michigan, like most states, does not have a mandatory written fee agreement rule.
As far back as 1985, the Michigan Attorney Grievance Administrator, who
represents the prosecutorial arm of Michigan's disciplinary system, advocated to the
Michigan Supreme Court a need for a mandatory written fee agreement rule. 7
The Michigan Supreme Court ignored the concern expressed by the Grievance
Administrator a decade ago. The interest for a mandatory written fee rule was
reignited in 1996 when a different Grievance Administrator proposed three
alternative rules to the Michigan Supreme Court, any of which would have
mandated written fee agreements between lawyers and clients. 8 Grievance
Administrator Philip Thomas' three proposals would alternatively require (1) the
deletion of "preferably" from MRPC 1.5(b); (2) an amendment to MRPC 1.5(c)
expressly stating that it is misconduct for a lawyer to accept retention without
acquiring a written fee agreement as specified in the rule; or (3) the adoption of a
new court rule outside the purview of the Michigan Rules of Conduct that would
take away the right of an attorney to sue a client for unpaid attorney fees if a
written fee agreement had not been properly executed. 9
16. See D.C. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5(b) ("When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client,
the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable
time after commencing the representation."); N.J. R. PROF. CONDUcT 1.5 (providing substantially similar
language). However, rule 1.5(b) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct requires greater detail
in the mandatory fee agreement:
When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee,
whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses
of litigation, and the scope of the matter to be undertaken shall be communicated to the
client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
This paragraph shall not apply to public defenders or in situations where the lawyer will
be paid by the court or a state agency.
CONN. R. PROF. CONDUcr 1.5(b); see also Jeffrey Taylor, Work In Progress: The Vermont Rules of
Professional Conduct, 20 VT. L. REV. 901, 943 n.126 (1996) (arguing for a mandatory written fee
agreement rule to alleviate the proof problems that exist in a disputed oral fee agreement lawsuit or
arbitration proceeding).
17. See Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note 1, at 681 n.60. In 1985, Michigan lawyers were
obliged to adhere to the Michigan Code of Professional Responsibility, which was silent concerning the
need for written fee agreements. The Michigan rule was a restatement of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. See supra note 10.
18. See Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note 1, at 682-83 n.61. The Michigan Supreme Court
adopted the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct which became effective November 1, 1988. Rule
1.5(b) does not require a written fee agreement in non-contingent cases).
19. The three proposals sent to the Michigan Supreme Court by the Grievance Administrator Philip
1998]
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In response to Grievance Administrator Philip Thomas' proposal, the Michigan
Thomas were:
A. AMENDMENT TO MICHIGAN RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(b)
The simplest method of implementation of such a requirement would be to modify
Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(b) to delete the word "preferably." The rule
would then read, "When a lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate
of the fee shall be communicated to the client, in writing ... ." This modification would
require that lawyers who have not represented a client regularly in the past, reduce their
fee agreements to writing. While this approach is simple, it leaves something to be
desired because it fails to adequately address the form the written agreement is to take.
Further, it limits the requirement of [the form] a written fee agreement is to take. Further,
it limits the requirements of a written fee agreement to those situations where an
established attomey/client relationship does not already exist.
B. AMENDMENT TO MICHIGAN RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(c)
The Court could also effectuate a written fee agreement requirement through an
amendment to Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c) to state that it would be
misconduct for an attorney to accept retention without having an executed written
agreement. The following is a draft amendment:
All fee agreements entered into between a lawyer and a client shall be in writing. The
written fee agreements must contain:
(I) All material provisions relating to the scope of the representation;
(2) Any limitations placed on the scope of the representation;
(3) Specific provisions concerning the charges for legal services id how payment is
to be provided;
(4) The amount of money paid as a retainer, and,
(5) The signatures of the lawyer and client, and any third person assuming respon-
sibility for the lawyer's fee. The agreement shall be dated. The client and any third person
assuming responsibility for the fee shall be provided with a copy of the fee agreement at
the time it is executed.
C. ADOPTION OF A NEW MICHIGAN COURT RULE 2.114(G)
The third means of accomplishing the implementation of a written fee agreement re-
quirement would not result in a finding of professional misconduct, should an attorney fail
to utilize a written retainer agreement. However, under this third alternative, if a written
fee agreement was not executed, an attorney could not sue a client to collect an
outstanding fee. An amendment to Michigan Court Rule 2.114(G) which reads as follows,
could accomplish this change. MCR 2.114(G):
Any complaint filed by or on behalf of an attorney, seeking collection of outstanding
attorney fees from a client, shall have attached to it a copy of the written fee agreement
entered into between the attorney and client. The fee agreement shall contain the
following:
(1) All material provisions relating to the scope of the representation;
(2) Any limitations placed on the scope of the representation;
(3) Specific provisions concerning the charges for legal services and how payment is
to be provided;
(4) The amount of money as a retainer, and,
(5) The signatures of the lawyer and client, and any third person assuming respon-
sibility for the lawyer's fee. The agreement shall be dated. The client and any third person
assuming responsibility for the fee shall be provided with a copy of the fee agreement at
the time it was executed.
In the absence of such a fee agreement, there is not right of recovery by the attorney
on the claim.
Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note 1, at 682-83 n.61.
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Supreme Court informed the President of the State Bar of Michigan that the court
was contemplating the publication of a proposed rule for comments. The rule would
be based upon one of Mr. Thomas' proposed amendments in requiring a written fee
agreement when a previously established lawyer-client relationship did not exist?1
The court invited the State Bar of Michigan's members to state their reactions to the
possibility of the court's publication of such a proposed rule.2' The State Bar of
Michigan then referred the issue of mandatory written fee agreements to its
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics which subsequently concluded that
mandatory written fee agreements should not be the basis of a disciplinary rule.'
Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court did publish a proposed rule change
which would mandate a written fee agreement unless a client-lawyer relationship
already existed."
The legal press in Michigan has covered the debate of the proposed rule change
regarding mandatory written fees.u A survey of Michigan lawyers clearly
established a strong sentiment against the proposed mandatory written fee rule.
Eighty-one percent of the attorneys responding to a newspaper poll opposed the
suggested Supreme Court Rule.' Most of the lawyer's negative responses in the
poll stem from an emotional response to the issue rather than a well-articulated legal
position. The responses also suggest that lawyers are more concerned about their
perceived best interests than the public's best interests.2
The Michigan experience is significant irrespective of what the Michigan
Supreme Court ultimately does. Michigan proves that most lawyers view a
mandatory written fee rule with suspicion and fear2 Many lawyers are concerned
20. See Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note I, at 684 n.62.
21. See id. at 684 n.63.
22. See id. at 684 n.64.
23. See MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Proposed Rule (1996)).
24. See Marcia McBrien, Written Fee Agreements Required by Proposed Rule, 11 MICH. L. WKLY.
473 (1997); Chris Parks, High Court Weighs New Fee Agreement Rules, DET. LEGAL NEws, Jan. 30,
1997, at 1.
25. See Marcia M. MeBrien, Poll Results: Fee Agreements in Writing Disfavored, 11 MICH. L.
WKLY. 709, 748 (1997).
26. See id. The survey asked the question: "Whether the Michigan Supreme Court should adopt an
attorney ethics rule that would require all fee agreements to be in writing where the lawyer has not
regularly represented the client." Id. Some of the responses to the survey question included:
"This proposed rule is not to serve the public, nor is it to serve the legal community. It is to serve
the attorney discipline board. That should not be the motivation for a rule."
"Making the failure to put fee agreements in writing an ethics violation will give unethical clients one
more angle in a word in avoiding paying their bills - if you sue me for the money I owe you, I will
file a grievance against you."
"As Lincoln said, a written fee agreement lets the client know he has an attorney and lets the attorney
know he has a client. Every lawyer should use them. Lawyers should also eat their vegetables and floss
daily. But should the Supreme Court mandate this behavior?"
"A kindergarten attempt to denigrate the practice of law by the inexperienced." Id.
"We do not need more rules that make the practice of law so increasingly difficult and fraught with
peril that good lawyers are driven from the practice." Id.
27. Against the sentiment of most lawyers, another committee of the State Bar of Michigan
(Standing Committee on Grievance) went on record as supporting the concept of mandatory written fee
1998]
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that such a mandatory rule would create an imbalance of power in favor of the
client by permitting clients to file grievances and to have a greater ability to contest
fee disputes. Hence, the need to rationally examine the arguments that favor a
mandatory written fee agreement rule becomes essential. This examination should
welcome the input from voices within the legal profession as well as outside of it.
Without the input of non-lawyers, vested interests may prevent lawyers from
recommending a rule that would be in the public's best interest. Ultimately, the
supreme court of every state should act independently of the organized bar in
deciding whether the public's interest demands a mandatory written fee agreement
rule.
IV. The Arguments for Mandatory Fee Agreements
A. Special Responsibilities of a Self-Policing Profession
The legal profession is primarily responsible for its own regulation.' The courts
bear the ultimate responsibility in regulating the legal profession." The indepen-
dence of the legal profession from government control helps to ensure that the legal
profession can work toward maintaining a proper functioning government even
when government must be challenged." Hence, the Preamble of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct states: "The profession has a responsibility to assure
that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of
parochial or self-interest concerns of the bar."3
The public benefit of mandatory written fee agreements should outweigh any
concerns the legal profession might have in protecting the interest of lawyers. A
mandatory written fee rule would substantially reduce the high incidence of fee
disputes linked to oral agreements. This benefit should negate lawyers' parochial
concerns about facing disciplinary charges for a failure to implement a written fee
agreement even when competent legal services have otherwise been rendered.
agreements. In its 1997 Annual Activities Statement, the Committee stated:
[Tihe Michigan Supreme Court has published for comment proposed amendments to
MRPC 1.5 and MCR 8.121 concerning the concept of mandatory written fee agreements.
The Attorney Grievance Administrator has for a long time advocated the use of written
fee agreements as a method of protecting both the public and attorneys. The Committee
has discussed and debated the concept of mandatory written fee agreements for a number
of years. Although the Committee has had difficulty over the years reaching consensus
on this issue, on the one occasion when the issue was actually put to a vote, the
Committee voted by a seven to two margin to endorse the concept of mandatory written
fee agreements. It should be noted, however, that a number of Committee members felt
and still feel strongly that written fee agreements should not be made a mandatory part
of the Court Rules nor the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct.
STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN STANDING COMM. ON GRIEVANCE, 1997 ANNUAL ACTIVITIES STATEMENT.
28. See CENTER FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT xvi (3d ed. 1995).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983).
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An ABA Task Force on Lawyer Business Ethics concluded that, irrespective of
the applicable rules, written fee agreements should be used for all representation. 2
The Task Force stated: "The best way to avoid misunderstandings between a lawyer
and client, and to further their mutual interest . . . is to have full and frank
discussions about a writing memorializing the understanding."33
The benefits to the public from having a mandatory written fee rule should
outweigh every opposing argument offered by the legal profession unless the legal
profession can meet the burden of showing that the absence of such a rule is in the
public's best interest. The legal profession has not yet met this burden.
B. The Lawyer as Fiduciary
The cornerstone of the client-lawyer relationship is the lawyer's duty of complete
and undivided loyalty to the client's interest.' The fiduciary responsibility of a
lawyer co-exists with the business aspect of the relationship35. The fiduciary
obligations of the lawyer become more meaningful when examined from the client's
perspective.'
Lawyers not only represent sophisticated clients in complex legal or business
matters but also unsophisticated clients with more common needs such as buying
a house, drafting a will, defending against criminal prosecution, or pursuing a tort
claim. The typical client must tell the lawyer highly personal and intimate
information. The client is forced into a position of having to trust the lawyer before
the lawyer has had an opportunity to actually earn that trust.
The client's need to trust the lawyer coupled with the client's inability to evaluate
the lawyer's trustworthiness creates an opportunity for the lawyer to easily exploit
the client. This dynamic was recognized by Dr. Andrew Watson, Professor of Law
and Psychiatry at the University of Michigan: "The client . . . places himself
entirely in the hands of the lawyer and must trust that his best interests will be
protected by him."38 The vulnerability of the client or the trust reposed in the
32. See ABA Task Force on Lawyer Business Ethics, Statement of Principles: The Task Force on
Lawyer Business Ethics, 51 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1306 (1996).
33. Id
34. See L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 909
(1980). In Kukla v. Perry, 105 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1960), the court in examining a transaction between
a lawyer and client stated: "The attorney not only has duties of care and professional skill, but he must
also conduct himself in a spirit of loyalty to his client, assuming a position of the highest trust and
confidence. His position is not one 'measured by the rule of dealing at arm's length."' Id. at 316 (quoting
Rippey v. Wilson, 280 Mich. 233, 243 (1937)).
35. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court confronted the issue
of whether the "Learned Profession" defense could exempt a state bar association from engaging in
"trader commerce" within the scope of the Sherman Act. See id. at 779. In Goldfarb, the Virginia Bar
Association promulgated a minimum fee schedule for its members. In finding a violation of Federal
Antitrust Laws, the court rejected the "Learned Profession" defense in stating: "It is no disparagement
of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect ... ." Id. at 788.
36. See Lawrence Dubin, Sex and the Divorced Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits?, I GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHiCS 585, 591 (1988) [hereinafter Dubin, Off Limits?].
37. See id.
38. Andrew S. Watson, The Lawyer As Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 8 (1965).
1998]
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lawyer by the client serve as the underpinnings for the establishment of a fiduciary
duty of a lawyer toward a client.39
Professor Charles Wolfram reiterates the lawyer's fiduciary duty to a client from
the client's perspective:
Whatever their resources, clients have a right to assume that a lawyer
who undertakes to listen to them and to render legal assistance can be
trusted with information and with the responsibility of handling the
client's matter in the client's best interest. The trust concept is reflected
in the phrase, which courts often repeat, to the effect that the relation-
ship between lawyer and client is one of "trust and confidence."'
What happens when a prospective client comes into a lawyer's office to discuss
the possibility of retaining the lawyer for a legal representation? Is the bargaining
power between lawyer and client equal? Is arriving at an agreed upon fee purely
a matter of arms-length contract negotiations between equal parties? Will a
vulnerable client or one who reposes trust in a lawyer at the outset of the
relationship be able to understand that the fee agreement needs to be actively
negotiated with the lawyer? Some lawyers argue that the decision to use or not use
a written fee agreement is simply a matter of contract - not ethics. For example,
Thomas Keinbaum, past president of the State Bar of Michigan, argued against a
mandatory written fee agreement rule, stating that the "disciplinary system is not the
place to determine the terms of a contract between a lawyer and client.""' While
Keinbaum concedes that a compelling reason could justify having an ethics rule
which mandates lawyers to "do something specific" like have written fee
agreements, he believes the advocates of such a rule have not met this burden.42
Keinbaum acknowledges that the main policy supporting written fee agreements "is
that you want to make sure there's no misunderstanding."43
The use of a written fee agreement would promote the lawyer as both fiduciary
and business person at the time of agreeing upon the fees. Perhaps the real
underlying fear of Keinbaum and other lawyers concerning written fee agreements
is clearly expressed by Nancy Wonch, Committee Chair of the State Bar of
Michigan's Committee on Professional and Judiciary Ethics which evaluated the
Michigan Supreme Court's proposed mandatory fee rule for the State Bar of
Michigan. She stated "that (a mandatory written fee rule) would make the lack of
a written fee agreement the basis of an ethics violation even if the client didn't
complain."" Hence, there is a clash of interest between the public and the legal
profession. Lawyers fear grievances will be filed against them for violation of what
amounts to a mere technicality - failing to comply with a mandatory written fee
39. See Dubin, Off Limts?, supra note 36, at 592.
40. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 147 (quoting Clancy v. State Bar of Cal., 454 P.2d 325, 336 (Cal.
1969)).
41. McBrien, Noncompliance, supra note 3, at 40.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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agreement rule. This fear ignores the fact that a mandatory written fee rule would
help the public in preventing many misunderstandings about legal fees between
lawyers and clients.
Clients are at a significant disadvantage when negotiating fee agreements with
lawyers because they generally lack sufficient knowledge or information to be able
to effectively negotiate the fee demands of a lawyer." The lawyer's fiduciary
obligation should require lawyers to ensure that vulnerable and/or trusting clients
clearly understand the financial obligations they will incur by hiring the services of
a lawyer. Hence, the lawyer's duty to communicate about the terms of retention
with a client can only have meaning if an agreement is memorialized in a writing.
C. Reduction in Fee Disputes - and Related Issues
The organized bar has taken a duplicitous position when it comes to fee disputes
between lawyers and clients. The bar encourages lawyers to resolve the disputes
through arbitration or mediation rather than court action,"7 but does not advocate
a mandatory written fee agreement rule which would help to prevent the dispute
from occurring in the first place. Most fee disputes would not occur if a written fee
agreement defined the scope of services to be performed and the basis upon which
the legal fees will be computed."' Not only would the public be protected by
having written fee agreements, such agreements would also protect the honest
attorney who accurately represented the basis for the charged legal fees to a client
and who now faces an allegation of improper or excessive fees. In fact, written fee
agreements protect both lawyers and clients.
D. Inherent Conflict of Interest
When setting a fee, the interests of lawyers and clients become divergent. A
lawyer may want to charge the client the highest fee that the market will bear. A
client may want to pay the lowest fee for the best available legal services. The
agreement for legal fees to be paid by the client to the lawyer represents a business
transaction between lawyer and client, although the lawyer still must act in
conformity with the ethical demands imposed upon the legal profession.
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(a) recognizes the inherent
conflict that exists when a lawyer enters into a business transaction with a client.
Rather than treating such a transaction as one at arm's length, the lawyer is
45. See WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 514.
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983). The rule states: "A lawyer
shall explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." Il
47. See supra note 11. Rule 1.5, comment 5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, titled
"Disputes Over Fees," states: "If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such
as an arbitration or mediation procedure by the bar, the lawyer shall conscientiously consider submitting
to it." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. 5 (1983). For a similar statement of
aspirational guidance, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 2-23 (1980).
48. See supra note 2; Sheridan, supra note 8, at 3.
49. See supra note 32.
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prohibited from doing business with a client unless, among other things, the
transaction is fair and fully disclosed in writing to the clientO°
Just as the comment to Model Rule 1.8 states that "[a]s a general principle, all
transactions between lawyer and client should be fair and reasonable to the
client,"'" this principle of fairness to resolve the conflict of interest dilemma should
require all fee agreements between lawyers and clients to be in writing. 2
E. Improvement of the Legal Profession's Image
In April 1997, a "Statewide Opinion Survey About Lawyers and the Legal
Profession" was commissioned by the State Bar of Michigan. 3 This study found
that 52% questioned had positive attitudes about lawyers while 48% had negative
or neutral attitudes.' However, only 30% of people believe that most lawyers are
honest while 23% felt few lawyers are honest.5 65% of those questions stated that
lawyers were overpriced while 46% felt lawyers were greedy. 6 Of those surveyed
who had previously used lawyers, 49% said that written fee agreements were used
and 51% said they were not.'
Mandatory use of written fee agreements would cause clients to appreciate
dealing with professionals who act in a business-like manner." Trust between
lawyers and clients will be furthered concerning the business aspect of the lawyer-
client relationship by using written fee agreements. The writing requirement would
force both lawyers and clients to discuss such issues as billing method; estimate of
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (1983). The rule states:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquired the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted to the client in a manner
which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the- transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
Id.
51. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 cmt. (1983).
52. See Robert H. Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The Rules of
Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REv. 823, 828-29 (1986). The author states
that it is perplexing that a writing is not required with respect to non contingent fee agreements since
Model Rule 1.8(a) requires written consent to a business transaction between lawyer and client to be in
writing. See id. at 829. No compelling reason could be discerned to justify a departure from the need
for a written agreement of legal fees which is an area which causes most of the bitter disputes between
lawyers and clients.
53. The survey was conducted from February 21-25, 1997, by Dr. Charles Atkin of Communication
Research Institute. A total of 470 random callers, representing a cross section of society, participated in
the survey.
54. See STATE BAR OF MICH., STATEWIDE OPINION SURVEY ABOUT LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 4 (1997).
55. See id. at 6.
56. See id. at 8.
57. See id. at 11.
58. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 56.
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total fees and expenses; amount of retainer and what it covers; and when fees are
to be paid and the consequences of failure to pay fees. 9
For every fee dispute that can be avoided as a result of requiring a written fee
agreement, the public's possible perception about lawyers will be more favorable.
The legal profession will not simply be gaining public support through a public
relations ploy, but also will be earning the trust of those members of the public who
have been diligently served by lawyers.
F. Removing An Inequity Faced by Clients
When a dispute arises over legal fees, the lawyer is in the advantageous position
of being able to sue the client for fees or defend an action brought by the client
without having to hire an attorney. The client, however, will have to retain and pay
for a second lawyer to represent the client's interest against the first lawyer. The
absence of a written fee agreement rule continues to magnify the inherent inequality
that exists between lawyers and clients during the time period in which a legal fee
is being agreed upon.
G. Rule of Fairness
Requiring that a client be informed by a lawyer in writing about how a legal fee
will be computed for services to be rendered at the outset of the representation
would be a fair and reasonable rule. If a lawyer engaged the services of a house
painter to perform painting services around the lawyer's home, the lawyer as a
consumer would want a written estimate of the services to be performed by the
painter. The potential clients of lawyers are entitled to as much protection in
coming to a complete understanding of legal fees as a consumer of services offered
by house painters.
H. Written Mandatory Fee Requirement Comports with Other Ethics Rules
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct were not
meant to be interpreted in a vacuum. Any new proposal must comport and be
harmonious with other provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.W The intent of a mandatory fee agreement proposal is certainly in
harmony with the Model Rule's overall goal of protecting the client.6 Indeed, a
stronger case for mandatory fee agreements is made when other pertinent provisions
within the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are examined.
59. See id.
60. The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, in part, that these are "Rules
of Reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and the law
itself." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr preamble (1983).
61. The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct further states, in part, that "the
profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not
in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr preamble (1983).
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1. Model Rule 1.4"
The rule most strongly consistent with mandatory written fee agreements is Rule
1.4. It requires that a lawyer communicate with a client regarding the status of a
matter. The duty to communicate is satisfied when the client has an adequate basis
of information to make a reasonably informed decision. There is no rational reason
as to why Model Rule 1.4 should not include the duty to communicate lawyer fees.
In fact, a rational and compelling argument could be made that knowing the "status
of a matter" includes the client having a clear understanding of the fee basis of the
representation. Therefore, the attorney would have a duty to communicate the fee
basis to the extent that the client can make reasonable decisions. Because an oral
estimate is more likely than not an unsatisfactory basis for the client's financial
decisions, it could be convincingly argued that Model Rule 1.4 mandates in most
instances that attorney fees be memorialized in a written agreement.
Attorney's fees are a springboard for many other important client decisions. A
simple oral recitation of the attorney's fees would provide little guidance as to the
potential ultimate cost of the representation. Without a written estimate, the client
is deprived of the opportunity to contact other lawyers about competitive rates.
Alternatively, in light of a written fee agreement, the client may inaccurately decide
that the price of legal services are too high to pursue the claim. Becauseof the
rising costs associated with litigating cases, many clients choose to settle even
though they believe they have the meritorious position. In order for clients to make
salient decisions about the objectives they want to pursue, they need to be able to
calculate anticipated attorney fees. This information will allow clients not only to
make decisions regarding their representation, but also to make these decisions in
a cost effective manner.
Another example illustrating the connection between client communication and
attorney fees is a client's preference or input as to whether to use on-line research
or traditional case digest research. The client should have access to the hourly rate
for computer generated legal research as compared to an attorney's hourly rate. By
being able to understand these comparative rates and the advantages and disad-
vantages of each, the client can determine or at least express a preference for the
most economical way to conduct legal research.
Determining whether or not to settle or which method of legal research to use are
merely two examples of client decisions that may be predicated in part on a clear
understanding of lawyer's fees.' By their very nature, oral agreements are conducive
to misunderstandings. The old adage "put it in writing" is certainly applicable.
62. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983). The rule provides: "Co.
mmunication ... (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.... (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." AL
63. ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 opines that a lawyer's duty to disclose not only the basis of the
fee but any other charges to the client (e.g., photocopying, computer searches) at the outset of the
representation. See ABA Formal Op. 93-379 (1993).
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Therefore, to facilitate truly informed client decisions in accordance with the spirit of
Model Rule 1.4, a fee agreement should be in writing.
2. Model Rule 1.8'
Model Rule 1.8 is also on point. It prohibits attorneys from engaging in business
transactions with a client unless the terms of the transaction are fully disclosed in
writing to the client. Model Rule 1.8 also mandate' that the lawyer obtain consent
from the client where the attorney will acquire "an ownership, possessory, security or
other pecuniary interests adverse to a client." Essentially, the relationship between the
client and the attorney is a business transaction for fiduciary legal services. Because
an attorney will naturally have his own financial interest at stake, the attorney has an
adverse interest to the client during the representation. Therefore, under Model Rule
1.8, the attorney's fees should be required to be fully disclosed in writing.
3. Model Rule 1.2(a)'5
Model Rule 1.2 defines the scope of the representation. Under Model Rule 1.2, the
client is responsible for defining the scope, whereas the attorney determines after
consultation with the client the means to accomplish the client's goals.
Model Rule 1.2 ties in Model Rule 1.4 because the client needs to be reasonably
informed in order to be able to determine the objectives of the representation.'
Determining the parameters of the representation requires a client to clearly analyze
the financial repercussions of the representation. Cost considerations are also an
important factor when determining the reasonably available means that should be
utilized to reach the intended objectives. Thus, Model Rule 1.2 also evidences the
important need for an accurate assessment of the lawyer's fees to be effectively
communicated to the client. Hence, the information concerning fees must be reduced
to a writing.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8. The rule provides:
Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client
unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed in transmitted in writing to the client in
a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id. The comment to Model Rule 1.8(a) states, in part: "[A]s a general principle, all transactions between
client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client." Id. Rule 1.8 cmt.
65. Rule 1.2(a), entitled "Scope of Representation," states in part: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
66. See supra note 63.
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4. Model Rule 1.17
Model Rule 1.1 mandates that a lawyer "provide competent representation to a
client." Under a broad definition of competence, it could be argued that Model Rule
1.1 should require written fee agreements. The Comment to Model Rule 1.1 states that
competence includes the "use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of
competent practitioners." It also includes "adequate preparation." Competence may be
difficult to clearly define but certainly the opposite of competence is neglect. An
attorney neglects his client by failing to carry out his or her assumed legal obligations
to a client. Under Model Rule 1.5, one such obligation is to inform the client of the
basis for the calculation of the fee. When an attorney fails to adequately inform the
client of this fact, the attorney has neglected an important obligation owed the client.
Extending this reasoning further, it could be argued that a practitioner who desires to
employ competent procedures and be adequately prepared must incorporate written fee
agreements into his or her practice.
5. Model Rule &48
Model Rule 8.4 prohibits an attorney from engaging in "conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law, where
such conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer." When a client is shocked upon discovering the attorney's bill, the blame
may be on the attorney for having failed to adequately disclose the basis of the fee.
The attorney's lack of or inadequate communication in fact may border on deceit or
misrepresentation. To avoid any allegations of dishonesty or misrepresentation, the
cautious attorney should solidify the fee arrangement into a written contract.
6. Model Rule 2.1""
Model Rule 2.1 provides that an attorney may refer to "moral, economic, social and
political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation" when rendering advice.
An obvious fact to every lawyer is that economic factors heavily influence people in
the decisions they make. Although a client may believe she has a strong case, it still
may not be in her financial interests to pursue litigation. Model Rule 2.1, therefore,
inherently promotes the requirement for written fee agreements.
67. The rule provides: "Competence... A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1983).
68. The rule states: "Misconduct ... It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 'engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcT Rule 8.4(c) (1983).
69. Rule 2.1 provides: "Advisor ... In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
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V. Arguments Against a Mandatory Written Fee Agreement Rule
It should be stated at the outset that there is no compelling argument that has
been raised against the requirement for written fee agreements. However, the
following considerations are offered in an attempt to present the counterarguments
to a mandatory written fee agreement rule.
A. Little Practical Effect
Even if Model Rule 1.5(b) required a written fee agreement, the fee agreement
could still lack specificity. Model Rule 1.5(b) only requires that an hourly or
transactional rate be quoted. If the American Bar Association is concerned with
clients truly understanding the basis of the fee, it should demand a more detailed
calculation of the fee. An hourly rate alone also would not enable a client to
comparison rate shop. One attorney may charge less, but take longer to complete
the work. One attorney's rate may include all costs and expenses, whereas
another's rate does not. Another problem with a contractual fee arrangement occurs
when an attorney uses a less detailed fee schedule. The client is then in a position
to later claim that she did not agree to pay for the unspecified services. A bare-
boned fee agreement as required by Model Rule 1.5(b) creates almost as many
potential misunderstandings as an oral agreement. Therefore, some may argue that
the adoption of a Model Rule merely requiring a written fee agreement would not
meet its goal of minimizing the number of fee disputes.
B. Written Fee Agreement Creates Inflexibility
The written contractual nature of a fee agreement may make both client and
attorney apprehensive. An attorney may spend a significant amount of time
analyzing the agreement before being willing to commence the performance of the
actual legal services. Likewise, a client may feel the need for another attorney to
analyze the fee agreement.
Problems also result when an attorney does not want to bill on an hourly rate.
The use of a flat fee or a hybrid fee requires some estimate as to the hours the
attorney will spend on the case. Since not all transactions require the same amount
of time to complete, a lawyer may not always be able to determine which cases
will involve more work at the outset of the representation.
A written fee agreement that must be prepared at or shortly after the initial
consultation, therefore, may not reflect a fair fee for handling the representation.
Attorneys would fear being locked into a fee at an unfair remunerative rate. The
result of attorneys bearing this risk could promote a pricing scheme where some
clients overpaid for the legal services and others underpaid.
C. Client Intimidation
Clients could potentially be intimidated by detailed fee agreements, especially
those that are clothed as formidable retainer agreements. However, this obstacle
is easily overcome by using a plain English engagement letter explaining the fees
in simple terms. The natural reluctance to discuss financial matters so early in the
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representation is like a trip to the dentist - painful but necessary to prevent
problems further down the road.
D. Fear of Professional Discipline
Lawyers fear the disciplinary authorities being able to prosecute lawyers for the
act of misconduct concerning whether a written fee agreement was obtained.
Lawyers view this danger as an example of overregulation of the legal profes-
sion."
E. Increase the Cost of Legal Services
On small matters that lawyers handle for clients, requiring the lawyer to expend
the time necessary to draft a written fee agreement could increase the ultimate cost
of the legal services to the client and hence be self-defeating.
VI. Experience of Those States That Have a Mandatory
Written Fee Agreement Rule
For those few states that have adopted a mandatory written fee agreement
requirement, the rules have not always been a panacea. At times, it may simply
change how the parties frame their issues. Undoubtedly, an important contributing
factor in making a mandatory written fee agreement rule successful is having
sanctions for rule violations. The experience of these minority jurisdictions can
serve as a road map to help determine the most effective type rule that the
American Bar Association can adopt in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
requiring a written fee agreement.
A. Disputes Arising as to Whether a Written Fee Agreement Has Been Created
Because a written fee agreement is mandated, an attorney seeking to recover for
her services must allege that such an agreement was created. This requirement
leads to cases such as Wolk, Neuman, & Maziarz v. Turano,7" where the dispute
was over whether a letter written by the plaintiff law firm constituted a valid
written fee agreement even though the client never signed the letter. Ultimately,
the court held that the services were performed absent a valid contract because the
defendant client had never consented to the fee agreement, nor had the fees been
explained to the defendant.
In some cases, the lack of a written fee agreement may be an indicator that a
fee agreement was never formed in the first place. In Desarbo & Reichert, P.C.
70. See McBrien, Noncompliance, supra note 3, at 40,
71. No. 528505, 1996 WL434307 (Conn. Super. Ct., July 11, 1996). In this case, plaintiff law firm
represented Laura Turano in a defense matter where plaintiffs were seeking a prejudgment remedy.
Plaintiff law firm then sued Ms. Turano for $16,083 for the performance of 125 hours of legal work at
the rate of $185 per hour. Since the court found that there had been no fee agreement between lawyer
and client, the court found the law firm to be entitled to receive $10,387.50 based upon a quantum meruit
theory. See id. at *2.
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v. Cardow,' the plaintiff law firm argued that an oral contract for legal fees
should be enforced despite the lack of a written agreement. The court held that it
was unnecessary to decide whether an oral contract could be enforced because
there was no contract at all.' Rather, the plaintiff had erroneously assumed that
the defendant client had accepted their legal services. 4
B. Recovery on Quantum Meruit Theory Allowed
When a court finds there was no valid fee agreement, it may still award legal
fees pursuant to a quantum meruit theory." On one hand, it would seem unfair
to allow an attorney to collect the entire legal fee after failing to comply with the
mandatory written fee agreement rule. On the other hand, it would also be unfair
to permit a client to be unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of the attorney's
services without payment. Hence, some courts reach a comfortable middle ground
by awarding fees to the attorney, but the court calculates the amount of those fees
based upon a quantum meruit theory, which means the reasonable value of the
services rendered.
C. Sanctions for Failure to Form a Written Fee Agreement
The penalties for a failure to reduce a fee agreement to writing vary greatly.
Some courts refuse to award attorney's fees pursuant to an agreement that is not
in writing.76 In Freccia & Plotkin v. Castro,' the court held that where there
was no written agreement, "it would violate public policy for the plaintiffs to
recover fees based upon an agreement which violates Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct."78 Instead, an attorney has to pursue a claim under quantum
meruit.
Attorneys are also subject to professional discipline for failing to utilize written
fee agreements. In In re Williams,' an attorney who did not produce a written
72. No. CV 940360368, 1996 WL 727325 (Conn. Super Ct. Dec. 5, 1996).
73. See id at *3.
74. See id This case involved defendant Cardow contacting Mass Mutual Insurance Company about
estate planning information. An employee of the insurance company who conducted seminars for the
public in estate planning and offered free consultations with attorneys set up an appointment between
a member of plaintiff law firm and defendant. Defendant was informed by the insurance company
employee that the attorney consultation was free unless and until the attorney was hired by defendant.
At the meeting, the attorney suggested various wills and trusts for defendant and indicated a $2500
fee for their preparation. Defendant denies hiring the lawyer to draft these documents. The lawyer was
under the impression that he was retained by defendant whereas the defendant believed that he had not
retained the lawyer and in fact wished to further think about his legal needs. The lawyer never sent a
retainer agreement or any written correspondence acknowledging retention until the estate planning work
was completed. The court found under these circumstances that there was no agreement made for legal
services to be rendered to the defendant. See id. at *3.
75. See Ginberg v. Tauber, 678 A.2d 543, 551-52 (D.C. 1996); Wolk, Neuman, & Maziarz, 1996
WL 434307, at *1; Desarbo & Reichert, 1996 WL 727325, at *4.
76. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
77. No. CV960151637S, 1996 WL 526809 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 9, 1996).
78. Id. at *2.
79. 693 A.2d 327 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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agreement in a contingency case was issued an informal admonition."0 In
Hartford/New Britain Judicial District v. Millstein,8" the attorney's failure to
employ a written fee agreement, which was coupled with other egregious conduct,
resulted in the court disbarring him from the practice of law.'
The problem a court may encounter in enforcing a Rule 1.5 mandatory written
fee agreement rule was elucidated in Desarbo, Jensen & Reichert, P.C. v.
Bozzuto's Carting Co." In that case, the defendant client refused to pay the bill
of an attorney who had performed significant estate planning for the client. The
defendant claimed the fees were unconscionable because the total amount was not
reasonable and the fee agreement had not been reduced to writing.' Nevertheless,
the court held that a contract had been formed despite the lack of writing."
Furthermore, it refused to invalidate the attorney's fees for failure to provide a
written fee agreement.' In so doing, the court stated: "The word 'shall' that
appears in 1.5(b) does not automatically create a mandatory duty . . . .When
statutory language prescribes what is to be done but contains no penalty for
noncompliance the matter is considered to be one of convenience or directory. The
court concludes that Rule 1.5(b) is such a measure."87 Given the Bozutto's Carting
court's watered-down interpretation of Rule 1.5, a tough stance on attorney fees
appears to be needed to enforce compliance with the rule.
D. Other Possible Claims
Sometimes, dissatisfied clients have been forced to become creative in order to
obtain a satisfactory remedy. Desarbo & Reichert v. Cardow" is also noteworthy
because it demonstrates one such creative approach. After being sued for not
paying his attorney's fees, the defendant client in Desarbo & Reichert counter-
claimed against the plaintiff. He alleged that the law firm's conduct in pursuing the
claim for fees was an unfair trade practice in violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practice Act (CUTPA). The court held that the law firm had violated
CUTPA because it made allegations which the firm knew had no basis in fact."
The court expressly held that it was not deciding whether a Rule 1.5(b) violation
could constitute an unfair trade practice.' Nonetheless, it has left this possible
allegation open for future claims.
80. See id. at 327.
81. No. CV940538618S, 1997 WL 345356 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1997).
82. See id. at *1, *5.
83. No. CV90-0307495S, 1995 WL 462389 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 28, 1995).
84. See id. at *4.
85. See id. at *7.
86. See id. at *5.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. No. CV940360368, 1996 WL 727325 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1996).
89. See id. at *5.
90. See id. at *6.
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VII. Analysis of Different Types of Rules and Recommendations for ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(b)
A. Model Rule 1.5(b) (Adopted in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and D.C.)
Model Rule 1.5(b) provides: "When the lawyer has not regularly represented the
client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, in writing,
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation."'"
The ABA Model Rule mandating written fee agreements would certainly be a
positive start. However, the only real change is that "preferably" has been deleted
from the phrase "in writing." Therefore, any problems with the original provision,
such as the lack of sanctions, still remain.
One gaping deficiency in this type of Rule is the specification requirements for
the basis of the fee. The requirements of the written fee agreement are so minimal
that they are easily satisfied with a very general and vague disclosure. The rule in
effect would be a definite improvement but would not solve many of the problems
that exist with the current requirement that the agreement be "preferably in
writing." Even the Comment to the rule does not correct the deficiency in stating
that, "It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee,
but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for
example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an
estimate amount."'
Mere compliance with this Rule by providing an hourly rate may still not give
the client the necessary information to make informed decisions concerning the
representation. An hourly rate in and of itself may be meaningless to a client.
Without discussion of the amount of time it will take to complete the services, the
attorney will not adequately portray as a reasonable estimate the final bill. Also,
a client should be made aware of varying rates for attorneys and non-lawyers
within the law firm. Furthermore, the client must be informed if he or she is
responsible for additional costs and expenses.
Another problem with the Model Rule stems from its exemption of regularly
represented clients. On the surface, this appears to be a sensible provision.
Common sense dictates that unsophisticated clients who only turn to an attorney
when one is needed will be more vulnerable and susceptible to unfair billing or
inadequate explanations. A client who is regularly represented should generally
possess more sophistication or, at a minimum, some familiarity with respect to the
legal fees. Ongoing clients will have established an already existing relationship
with their attorney. This fact alone will put them in a better position to negotiate
if a dispute arises. Also, they have more bargaining power in setting the terms of
billing for subsequent matters. Consequently, they may be more active in disputing
bills and negotiating for better rates.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (1983).
92. Id. Rule 1.5(b) cmt.
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The fallacy in reasoning that all regularly represented clients do not need written
fee agreements was exposed in Ginberg v. Tauber." In Ginberg, the plaintiff
attorney had represented the defendant client over a ten-year period. Initially,
Ginberg brought two claims which subsequently resulted in two trials and two
appeals.' Ginberg had also represented the defendant in at least five other
transactions. After the defendant client settled the case, the attorney brought an
action seeking to recover $3,750,000 in attorney fees pursuant to a quantum meruit
theory." The parties had never entered into a written fee agreement, yet the
attorney claimed that they had an "understanding" that the fee would be based on
the judgment received by his client in the appeals case.'
Ginberg evidences that misunderstandings over attorney fees can result even
with a regularly represented client. By disproving the assumption that clients who
are sophisticated will have the knowledge to understand ambiguous fee agreements,
it shows the need for regularly represented clients to also be covered by Rule 1.5.
Ginberg also demonstrates that a client in an ongoing representation may be as
susceptible to placing blind faith in the attorney as a new client. In Ginberg, the
defendant, a real estate developer who held a number of multimillion dollar
properties, testified that although none of the attorney's fee bills he had previously
received from Ginberg stated the number of hours Ginberg had spent on the matter
at issue, he trusted Ginberg, and never had any reason to question the amount of
the fee.'
Ginberg is an example of a case where the fees from prior representations
provides no basis for the client to understand the fees in subsequent represen-
tations. In Ginberg, the disputed fees were a result of complex litigation spanning
over a ten'year period. Earlier fees were the consequence of finite transactions.
In general, Ginberg illustrates that ongoing representations do not preclude fee
misunderstandings from arising in the absence of a fee contract. The underlying
policy behind requiring written attorney fee agreements is to minimize the impact
of disputes over attorney's fees. This concern is not per se obviated simply
because the client has previously been regularly represented by the lawyer.
Model Rule 1.5(b) also fails to make an obvious exception for public defenders.
Because there is no fee exchanged between the client and the attorney, there is no
need for a fee agreement. Similarly, attorneys who are funded by other state
agencies should be exempted from the rule.
One clause of Model Rule 1.5(b) that could be argued as a strength or weakness
is the reasonable time requirement. The rule leaves too much room for interpreting
what constitutes a reasonable time to communicate the written fee. However, a
strict deadline would hurt attorneys who discover in subsequent meetings that the
scope of the representation is greater than originally anticipated. Also, in some
93. 678 A.2d 543 (D.C. 1996).
94. See id. at 545-46.
95. See id. at 544.
96. Id. at 543.
97. See id. at 546.
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exigent circumstances, a written fee agreement may not be feasible within a tight
time frame.
B. Connecticut - Rule 1.5 Fees
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 provides:
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the
basis or rate of the fee, whether and to what extent the client will be
responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation, and the
scope of the matter to be undertaken shall be communicated to the
client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing
the representation. This paragraph shall not apply to public defenders
or in situations where the lawyer will be paid by the court or a state
agency."
The Connecticut rule attempts to correct some of the deficiencies of Model Rule
1.5. First, the plain language of the rule provides guidance as to the content of the
fee agreements. Not only must the basis of the fee be disclosed, but also the scope
of the representation and additional costs and expenses billable to the client. The
rule also exempts public defenders and state agency attorneys. However, the
Connecticut rule still is deficient by exempting regularly represented clients and
failing to create penalties for noncompliance.
C. Guam - Rule 9216
Guam Rule 9216, entitled "When Written Fee Agreements Are Required for
Attorneys," provides:
(a) In representing a client, an attorney shall have a written fee
agreement which is signed by the client if:
(1) The contemplated fee is in excess of $500, or
(2) An appearance is required or reasonably contemplated before any
court or agency by the attorney, or
(3) The fee is contingent.
(b) Such fee agreements shall be in clear and concise language and
shall clearly spell out the general nature of the work to be done by the
attorney and the financial obligation of the client to pay for such work.
In uncontested matters, it shall spell out the financial obligations if the
matter becomes contested. If the fee is based on an hourly rate, the
hourly rate shall be stated.
(c) An attorney shall have his or her client sign such a fee
agreement within forty-eight (48) hours of the time the attorney is
retained unless that is impossible because the client is outside of Guam
or incarcerated or otherwise unavailable, in which case a fee agreement
shall be signed at the earliest possible time.
98. CONN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (1996).
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(d) Within ninety (90) days of this section becoming law, the Ethics
Committee of the Guam Bar Association shall publish various model
fee agreements and make the same available to Bar Association
members of use or modification, but use of such model forms shall not
be mandatory as long as the form used complies with this section.
(e) In the absence of a required fee agreement with the client, claims
for attorneys fees incurred before a fee agreement was signed shall be
unenforceable.
(f) Any attorney who is representing clients without written fee
agreements on the effective date of this section shall have sixty (60)
days to obtain such written fee agreements.
(g) Nothing herein shall prevent the parties from amending any fee
agreement, nor shall it prevent an attorney raising his or her hourly
rates upon thirty (30) days notice to the client if such right is reserved
in the agreement.
(h) An attorney may withdraw from representation of his or her
client when the court finds at a hearing after notice to the client that
such client has failed to meet the financial obligations set out in the
written fee agreement."
Without a doubt, the strictest rule regarding written fee agreements was enacted
in Guam. The rule mandates written fee agreements in three situations, whereas
most states now only require a written fee agreement in contingency cases. The
rule addresses many of the Model Rule's deficiencies. First, regularly represented
clients are not expressly exempted. Since most ongoing relationships will involve
fees in excess of $500, the attorney will be required to form a written fee
agreement. Second, the rule mandates written fee agreements where there will be
a court appearance. This provision will protect clients involved in litigation who
are concerned about retaining their attorney on appeal at a similar rate.
The real distinguishing feature of Guam's rule is its bite. It is the only rule that
goes beyond mere aspirations and provides clients with a real remedy - claims
for fees are unenforceable in the absence of a written fee agreement. For cases
where the absence of a written fee agreement occurred prior to the adoption of the
rule, lawyers are allowed sixty days to obtain the necessary agreement. Further-
more, lawyers are required to have their clients sign a fee agreement within forty-
eight hours of retention of the attorney. Of course this rule is subject to exceptions
for exigent circumstances.
The Guam rule is not without faults. Like its predecessor rules, it does not
provide complete specificity as to the contents of the fee agreement. Also, the
Guam rule is perhaps too strict in mandating that the written fee agreement must
be formed within forty-eight hours. The problem is that some agreements would
have to be changed after further facts are elicited from the client. However, the
rule does permit attorney and client to amend fee agreements. Therefore, forty-
99. 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § 9216 (1995).
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eight hours may be too short a time period. Although some would argue that the
Guam rule is too harsh by precluding attorneys from recovering without a written
fee agreement, Guam has at least provided a way to enforce the rules.
D. Proposed Amendment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c)"
In view of the deficiencies exhibited in ABA Model Rule 1.5(b), the ABA
should not amend its existing rule by simply deleting "preferably." Rather, the
ABA should adopt a proposed amendment to 1.5(c) that would provide a
substantive basis for calculating attorney's fees and drafting a fee agreement.''
In order to effectuate true remedies for violations of the mandatory fee agreement,
the ABA should also adopt the Guam rule that would preclude an attorney from
suing his client to recover fees." Finally, as with the Guam rule, a minimum
threshold of fees should be excluded from the application of the mandatory written
fee rule so as to assist lawyers in representing clients on minor matters that do not
warrant the protection of a written fee agreement.
By following these suggestions, the ABA would have an effective mandatory
written fee agreement rule that could serve as a model for other states. Violation
of the rule would give rise to a prosecution for misconduct by the disciplinary
authorities of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is practicing law. Most
importantly, such a mandatory written fee agreement rule would serve to protect
the best interests of the public and the legal profession.
100. See Dubin, Protect the Public, supra note 1, at 680-85.
101. See supra note 19 (setting forth the requirements, in proposal B, for a written fee agreement
that may provide adequate disclosure to a client). In addition, expenses chargeable to the client should
be stated in the agreement.
102. See supra note 19 (presenting the specifies of the Guam Rule in proposal C).
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